University of Mississippi

eGrove
Faculty and Student Publications

Engineering, School of

1-1-2020

TIMCC: On Data Freshness in Privacy-Preserving Incentive
Mechanism Design for Continuous Crowdsensing Using Reverse
Auction
Xiaoqiang Ma
Huazhong University of Science and Technology

Weiwei Deng
Huazhong University of Science and Technology

Feng Wang
University of Mississippi

Menglan Hu
Huazhong University of Science and Technology

Fei Chen
Qingdao University
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/engineering_facpubs

SeePart
nextof
page
additional
authors and Bioengineering Commons, Chemical Engineering Commons,
the for
Biomedical
Engineering
Civil and Environmental Engineering Commons, Computer Engineering Commons, Electrical and
Computer Engineering Commons, Geological Engineering Commons, and the Mechanical Engineering
Commons

Recommended Citation
Ma, X., Deng, W., Wang, F., Hu, M., Chen, F., & Hassan, M. M. (2020). TIMCC: On Data Freshness in PrivacyPreserving Incentive Mechanism Design for Continuous Crowdsensing Using Reverse Auction. IEEE
Access, 8, 1777–1789. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2962212

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Engineering, School of at eGrove. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty and Student Publications by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Authors
Xiaoqiang Ma, Weiwei Deng, Feng Wang, Menglan Hu, Fei Chen, and Mohammad Mehedi Hassan

This article is available at eGrove: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/engineering_facpubs/9

SPECIAL SECTION ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN EMERGING
DECENTRALIZED COMMUNICATION ENVIRONMENTS

Received November 22, 2019, accepted December 18, 2019, date of publication December 25, 2019,
date of current version January 6, 2020.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2962212

TIMCC: On Data Freshness in Privacy-Preserving
Incentive Mechanism Design for Continuous
Crowdsensing Using Reverse Auction
XIAOQIANG MA 1 , (Member, IEEE), WEIWEI DENG 1 ,
FENG WANG 2 , (Senior Member, IEEE), MENGLAN HU 1 , FEI CHEN
AND MOHAMMAD MEHEDI HASSAN 4 , (Senior Member, IEEE)

3,

1 School

of Electronic Information and Communications, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China
of Computer and Information Science, The University of Mississippi, Oxford, MS 38677, USA
3 College of Computer Science and Technology, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China
4 College of Computer and Information Sciences, King Saud University, Riyadh 11543, Saudi Arabia
2 Department

Corresponding author: Mohammad Mehedi Hassan (mmhassan@ksu.edu.sa)
This work was supported by King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, through Researchers Supporting Project number RSP-2019/18.

ABSTRACT As an emerging paradigm that leverages the wisdom and efforts of the crowd, mobile
crowdsensing has shown its great potential to collect distributed data. The crowd may incur such costs and
risks as energy consumption, memory consumption, and privacy leakage when performing various tasks,
so they may not be willing to participate in crowdsensing tasks unless they are well-paid. Hence, a proper
privacy-preserving incentive mechanism is of great significance to motivate users to join, which has attracted
a lot of research efforts. Most of the existing works regard tasks as one-shot tasks, which may not work very
well for the type of tasks that requires continuous monitoring, e.g., WIFI signal sensing, where the WiFi
signal may vary over time, and users are required to contribute continuous efforts. The incentive mechanism
for continuous crowdsensing has yet to be investigated, where the corresponding tasks need continuous
efforts of users, and the freshness of the sensed data is very important. In this paper, we design TIMCC,
a privacy-preserving incentive mechanism for continuous crowdsensing. In contrast to most existing studies
that treat tasks as one-shot tasks, we consider the tasks that require users to contribute continuous efforts,
where the freshness of data is a key factor impacting the value of data, which further determines the rewards.
We introduce a metric named age of data that is defined as the amount of time elapsed since the generation
of the data to capture the freshness of data. We adopt the reverse auction framework to model the connection
between the platform and the users. We prove that the proposed mechanism satisfies individual rationality,
computational efficiency, and truthfulness. Simulation results further validate our theoretical analysis and
the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.
INDEX TERMS Crowdsensing, incentive mechanism, privacy-preserving, age of data.
I. INTRODUCTION

Recent years have witnessed the proliferation of smartphones and wearable devices [1]. Thanks to the various
functionalities of embedded sensors, these devices not only
have plenty of computation and communication capabilities, but also become an important interface between users
and the environment [2]. With potential users round-theclock, large area coverage, and low maintenance cost,
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Shui Yu.
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crowdsensing — crowdsourcing with mobile devices, a
paradigm that makes use of the wisdom and efforts of the
crowd, has shown its great impact in many areas, e.g., indoor
localization [3], [4], environmental monitoring [5], [6], traffic
prediction [7], and healthcare [8].
It has been reported that crowdsensing applications have
attracted millions of contributors [9]. Performing crowdsensing tasks, however, will inevitably incur some costs to
users such as energy consumption and possible privacy leakage. Therefore, the users may not be willing to join the
paradigm unless they are well-paid. Without enough users
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generation of the data. Naturally, it captures the freshness
of data. We adopt the reverse auction framework to simulate
the connection between the platform and users. We take the
metric age of data into consideration, and make it an influencing factor of the value of data, which further influences
the rewards. Furthermore, we design an incentive mechanism
TIMCC (Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Continuous
Crowdsensing) for both offline and online cases. TIMCC runs
round by round and assumes the age of data is negatively
correlated with the value of data, and then the value of data
influences the payment for winners. In each round, TIMCC
selects the winning bids first, and then determines the rewards
for the winners.
Our main contributions are summarized as following:
•

FIGURE 1. An illustrative example of a crowdsensing auction model.

to participate, the corresponding tasks may not be completed
successfully. Therefore, a proper incentive mechanism that
provides appropriate payment to users is of great significance
to the success of crowdsensing [10], [11].
Many research efforts have been poured into the design of
incentive mechanisms for crowdsensing [11], among which
reverse auction is one of the most commonly adopted models [12], [13]. The basic idea of reverse auction is presented
in Fig. 1. The users act as the seller, while the platform acts
as the buyer. The platform (a.k.a. auctioneer) first allocates
tasks. The users then submit to the platform a bid set containing one or more tasks that they are interested in, along with the
bid price for processing the tasks. Based on the users’ bids,
the platform determines the winners as well as the payments
according to their bids. Finally, the winners execute the tasks
and receive the rewards from the platform. The situation can
be divided into offline case and online case. For the offline
case, the platform (a.k.a. auctioneer) selects the winners when
it collects all the bids, while for the online case, the bids come
in the form of flow, and the platform must make a decision
(accept or reject) when a bid comes.
Although most of the existing solutions regard tasks as
one-shot tasks (like ‘‘go and fetch the ball’’), most crowdsensing tasks such as monitoring the traffic condition of
a town need the continuous contribution of users, because
the traffic condition varies over the time, making most of
the previous incentive mechanisms can not work very well
in such situations. Another shortcoming is that most of the
existing solutions neglect the time-sensitivity, i.e., they do
not care about when the users contribute to the system. But
in continuous crowdsensing, the freshness of data is very
important, especially in the presence of a monitoring task,
which urges the incentive mechanism to take the freshness of
data into consideration.
Inspired by [14]–[17], we introduce a metric age of data
which is defined as the amount of time elapsed since the
1778

•

•

To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
to design truthful incentive mechanism for continuous
crowdsensing, taking into consideration the relationship
between the value of data and its age.
We combine the reverse auction framework with the age
of data and propose an incentive mechanism TIMCC
where a bid’s value is related to its age.
We prove that TIMCC satisfies individual rationality,
computational efficiency, and truthfulness, which is also
validated by extensive simulations.

The rest of this paper is organized as follow. In Section II,
we formulate the system model along with the definition
of the age of data. In Section III, we introduce the strategic behaviors, several properties, and the detail of TIMCC.
In Section IV, we provide the theoretical analysis of TIMCC.
Simulation results are presented in Section V, and some
related works are briefly reviewed in Section VI. We discuss
some future directions in Section VII, and conclude this paper
in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. CROWDSENSING AND AUCTION MODEL

Table 1 summarizes the notations used in this paper. We consider a discrete-time system with time slots t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
There is a platform resided in the cloud and a job 0 to be
completed. Participators connect with the cloud through some
well-designed networks [18], [19]. The job can be divided
into many indivisible small tasks 0 = {τ1 , τ2 , . . . , τm }. Small
task τi needs qi (may be different between small tasks) users
to contribute to it at each slot. Then for all small tasks,
we have a vector Q = (q1 , q2 , . . . , qm ). To a certain extent, qi
reflects the importance degree of small task τi . For example,
if q1 = 3 and q2 = 4, then at each slot, small task τ1 needs
three users and τ2 needs four users. τ2 is attached to more significance than τ1 . In addition, we consider the situation where
all small tasks need the continuous contribution of users. For
example, a job to draw a map of the traffic condition of a
town. The whole area contains many points of interests. Each
point is associated with a small task. The point with higher
vehicle flow may have a higher q. Furthermore, as the traffic
condition varies over time, continuous update is needed while
VOLUME 8, 2020
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TABLE 1. Summary of notations.

FIGURE 2. An illustrative of anonymizer.

the map is drawn. Users are thus required to make continuous
efforts to draw the map and update it. In this case, the map
needs to be updated once a slot with the sensed data. Such a
job 0 is completed if and only if, at all time slots, all small
tasks in 0 are completed.
There is a set of users P = {p1 , p2 , . . . , pn } who can provide services to collect data to contribute to the job. Consider
a user cannot appear at two different places at the same time
slot, we make an assumption that each user pj ∈ P can
only contribute to one small task at a slot, but can contribute
to different small tasks at different slots. Contributing to
the corresponding task will incur a cost to the user such as
resource consuming and privacy leakage. The cost is private
and only known to the user itself.
Considering that many crowdsensing applications and
websites have attracted millions of clicks, competition exists
among users. We use the reverse auction framework to model
the competition and the interaction between the platform and
users. The reason why we call it reverse auction is that the
role of seller and buyer are reversed in the auction. Users
are sellers and sell their services, the platform serves as the
buyer and buys service of users. The platform selects some
users as winners according to some mechanisms, and only
winners have the opportunity to provide services and receive
the reward.
Due to the distributed nature of crowdsensing, users may
suffer the privacy leakage when submit their bids. There are
many researches that focus on the privacy protection. The
authors in [20] use the k-anonymity to protect user’s privacy,
and they employ a trusted third-party (anonymizer). Users
first send their message to the anonymizer which then aggregates the massage of k users within a cloaked region and sends
the cloaked message to the platform. We adopt this manner,
and assume that there is a trusted third-party (anonymizer).
Users do not connect with the platform directly, instead
they submit their bids to the anonymizer first, and then the
VOLUME 8, 2020

anonymizer aggregates the message and sends to the platform. Fig. 2 gives an illustration of how the anonymizer
works.
Then the crowdsensing works as follow:
1) Tasks Publication: The platform publishes the job, along
with the corresponding set of small tasks, the vector Q =
(q1 , q2 , . . . , qm ).
2) Bids Submission: Each user pj submits its mj bids to
m m
m
the anonymizer: (σj1 , tj1 , a1j ), (σj2 , tj2 , a2j ), . . . , (σj j , tj j , aj j ),
where σjk is a small task that user pj is willing to contribute
to; tjk denotes a time slot when user pj can contribute its
efforts, i.e., when it can collect the sensed data; akj is the
bid price, which means that user pj will refuse to accept the
corresponding task if it fails to receive a reward no less than
akj . We use ckj to denote the true cost of user pj ’s contributing
to the task σjk . Note that akj is not always equals to ckj .
Consider that a single user can not appear at two different
locations at the same time, we set a constraint that each user
can submit no more than one bid in a time slot. Therefore, mj
has an upper bound T (which is the maximum number of time
slots), i.e., mj ≤ T for all j. We summarize the mj bids in a
m
vector Bj = (B1j , B2j , . . . , Bj j ), where Bkj is the k − th bid of
user pj , i.e., Bkj = (σjk , tjk , akj ). We further summarize the bids
of all users in a vector B = (B1 , B2 , . . . , Bn ). The anonymizer
aggregates all the bids and send the aggregated queries to the
platform.
3) Winning Bids Selection: After receiving all the message,
the platform selects the winning bids and allocates the tasks
according to some specific mechanisms.
4) Tasks Execution: The winners contribute to the tasks and
send the sensed data to the platform.
5) Receiving Payment: Platform sends the payment to the
anonymizer, and then the anonymizer sends the rewards to
the corresponding users. Assume the reward bid Bkj obtained
at slot t is Rkj (t) (Rkj (t) = 0 if bid Bkj loses at slot t), and
then the total reward bid Bkj obtained is the sum of Rkj (t),
PT
k
i.e., Rkj =
t=1 Rj (t). Accordingly, the reward user pj
Pm j k
obtained is the total reward of its all mj bids: Rj = k=1
Rj =
Pm j PT
k
t=1 Rj (t). We summarize two reward vectors: R =
k=1
(R1 , R2 , ...Rn ) and R(t) = (R1 (t), R2 (t), . . . , Rn (t)), where R
denotes the total rewards of all users, and R(t) denotes the
rewards at time slot t of all users.
B. AGE OF DATA

Now we introduce the definition of age of data. Inspired
by [14], [16], [21], we define the age of data as the amount
1779
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A. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR

FIGURE 3. Relationship between age and value.

of time elapsed since the generation of the data. Naturally,
it captures the freshness of data. It is equal to zero at the slot
when the data is sensed. When we refer to the word ‘‘data’’,
it means the data collected by a specific bid. In this sense, it is
equivalent between the age of data and the age of bid. We thus
use these two terms interchangeably for convenience. The age
of user pj ’s k − th bid Bkj at slot t is defined as Akj (t) = t − tjk ,
where t ≥ tjk , and tjk is the time slot when the data is
collected.
We assume that the age of data has an impact on the
value of data. How to measure the value of data is not a
simple question [22]. In this paper, we do not investigate this
question further and just assume that the value of data can be
determined by its age directly. We use Vjk (A) to denote the
value of data collected by user pj ’s k − th bid Bkj when its age
is A. Vjk (0) denotes the initial value. The initial value can be
different between users, which is reasonable because different
users may be equipped with different devices, or have a
different reputation among the platform. If a user holds a
more advanced device or has a higher reputation, then it has a
higher initial value. We assume that the initial value is known
to the platform.
In this paper, we mainly discuss the situation where
the value of data is negatively correlated with its age,
i.e., Vjk (A1 ) < Vjk (A2 ) when A1 > A2 for every j and k.
Furthermore, we set a threshold age K such that Vjk (A) = 0,
when A ≥ K ; Vjk (A) > 0, when A < K . Fig. 3 provides an
illustration. The threshold K indicates that when a bid’s age
is equal to or greater than K , the bid will lose its value and
has no chance to win. For the same reason, we also ignore the
difference between the value of data and the value of bids for
convenience.
III. TIMCC DESIGN

In this section, we first discuss strategic behavior of users
in our TIMCC design in subsection III-A and some desired
properties in subsection III-B. In subsection III-C, we formulate the details about the design of TIMCC.
1780

Due to the distributed nature of crowdsensing, the real cost
ckj of user pj ’s performing the small task σjk is private and
unknown to the platform. Each user is regarded as a strategic
but selfish individual who always wants to maximize its
utility, which is the sum of utilities of all its bids. The utility of
a bid is the difference between the payment of the bid and the
total real cost of performing the corresponding task. We allow
a bid to win more than once, and we have an indicator vector
m
x = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) where xj = (xj1 , xj2 , . . . , xj j ), and xjk
denotes the times that bid Bkj wins, it is zero if bid Bkj loses
all the time slots. The task in bid Bkj is accomplished by user
pj for xjk times, for each accomplishment, we assume it occurs
a cost ckj to the corresponding user. So the utility of user pj can
be computed as
mj
X
Ujk
(1)
Uj =
k=1

Ujk = Rkj − xjk ckj =

T
X

Rkj (t) − xjk ckj

(2)

t=1

where Ujk is the utility of bid Bkj , Rkj (t) is the reward for
bid Bkj at slot t, xjk ckj is the total cost of contributing to the
corresponding task.
Because each user is regarded as a strategic but selfish
individual who always wants to maximize its utility. It is
possible that some selfish individuals misreport its costs to
maximize its utility, i.e., for some j or k, akj is not equal
to ckj . Such kind of behavior is called strategic behavior.
The existence of strategic behaviors makes it difficult for the
platform to select those users with lower real cost.
B. DESIRED PROPERTIES

A well-designed incentive mechanism plays an important role
in the success of crowdsensing, where the following three
properties are desired.
• Individual Rationality: An incentive mechanism is
individually rational if a user can always acquire a nonnegative utility when reporting its real cost. Individual
rationality ensures each user’s cost is covered, as the
platform fails to attract enough users if its incentive
mechanism does not satisfy individual rationality.
• Computational Efficiency: An incentive mechanism is
computationally efficient if it can be executed within
a polynomial time. Computational efficiency is needed
to guarantee that the incentive mechanism is practically
executable.
• Truthfulness: An incentive mechanism is truthful if for
each user, it cannot obtain a higher utility by misreporting its cost. Truthfulness is designed to make the
incentive mechanism invulnerable to malicious price
manipulation. If truthfulness is not satisfied, dishonest
users submit untruthful bids and receive a higher reward
than they deserve, which damage the interest of honest
users.
VOLUME 8, 2020
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Among the three properties, truthfulness is the most
challenging when designing an incentive mechanism for
crowdsensing. Although there are many auctions satisfying
truthfulness [12], [23], their truthfulness may not be easily
held if simply combined with the concept of the age of data
and extended to a multi-round auction. For example, assume
π is a truthful auction model, based on which a user pj submits
its truthful bid and gains a reward Rj . Now if it knows the
distribution of other bids, it submits a bid with a higher bid
price than its truthful bid. It misses the current time slot,
but wins at the next slot and then receives a reward R∗j .
Because Rj and R∗j are calculated based on different bid sets
(at different time slots), R∗j may be larger than Rj . Then user
pj receives a higher reward by submitting untruthful bids, and
thus truthfulness is not guaranteed.
Note that we have a threshold age K . When a bid’s age is
greater than K , its value decreases to zero, and then the bid
will have no chance to win. If we set K = 1, then all old bids
will not be selected. This situation falls to the tradition cases
where the age of data is not taken into consideration, and the
platform only selects the fresh data [11], [13].
C. DETAILS OF TIMCC

We assume there exists a trust third-party (anonymizer)
between users and the platform. The anonymizer collects the
bids from users and then aggregates the massage of users
within a cloaked region to sends to the platform. The platform
adopts a similar idea with the k − th lowest price auction,
in which bidders who submit the k − 1 lowest prices are
selected as winners, and they are rewarded with the payment
of the k −th lowest price. Naturally, the reward is no less than
their bid price, and all winners are rewarded the same amount
of payment. It has been proven that the auction is truthful [24].
TIMCC runs round by round and allows a bid to win for
more than once. For each accomplishment, we assume it
occurs a cost to the corresponding user. For the offline case,
each round consists of three components. The first component
adopts a greedy policy, with the aim of maximizing the ratio
of value to cost to determine the winning bids, we call it
Winning Bids Selection, which is described in Algorithms 1.
The second component determines an appropriate payment
for each winning bid, and we call it Pricing as described
in Algorithms 2. The third component updates the bid set
and makes preparation for the next round. Consider the third
component is very simply, we do not describe it in a separate
algorithm and write it into the final algorithm directly.
For each small task τi ∈ 0, qi > 0 winners are required.
Winning bids are selected not merely based on the bid price,
but also the ratio of value to bid price to achieve the highest
gain per unit cost. In this case, bids with the qi highest
ratio of value to bid price are selected as winning bids. The
corresponding payment is determined by the critical ratio,
which is defined as the qi + 1 − th highest ratio of value to bid
price. For ease of presentation, we define vkj (t) = Vjk (Akj (t)),
the notation vkj (t) denotes the value of bid Bkj at time slot t.
VOLUME 8, 2020

Algorithm 1 WinBidSelection
Input: B, 0, Q, t
Output: Bw , R̄t
t
E
1 Initialization: Bw ← ∅, R̄ ← 0
2 for each task τi ∈ 0 do
3
l←0
4
while l < qi do
Akj (t)

∗
Bkj∗

8

← arg maxBk {
S ∗j
Bw ← Bw {Bkj∗ };
l ← l + 1;
end

9

R̄ti ← maxBk {

5
6
7

j

10
11

vkj (t)
akj

vj

akj

| σjk = τi , Bkj ∈
/ Bw };

| σjk = τi , Bkj ∈
/ Bw };

end
return R̄t , Bw

Algorithm 2 Pricing

1
2
3
4
5

Input: Bw , R̄t , t
Output: R(t)
Initialization: R(t) ← 0E
for each winning bid Bkj ∈ Bw do
Rj (t) ← Rj (t) +

vkj (t)
R̄tj

end
return R(t)

Algorithm 1 determines the winning bids, which takes the
set of bids B, Q, the set of small tasks 0, and the time slot t as
input, and outputs the winning bids, as well as the critical ratio
vector R̄t = (R̄t1 , R̄t2 , . . . , R̄tm ), where R̄tj is the critical ratio
for small task τj at slot t. Given the time slot, a small task
is one-to-one corresponded with its critical ratio. In line 1,
we initialize Bw as an empty set and R̄t as a zero vector. Then
the for loop determines the winning bids for each small task.
In the for loop, l depicts the number of winners that have been
selected. From line 4 to line 8, we select qi winning bids with
the qi highest ratio of value to bid price for each small task
in 0. In line 9, we compute the qi +1−th highest ratio of value
to bid price(critical ratio) R̄ti , which will be used to compute
the final payment.
Algorithm 2 calculates the payment for each user, which
takes the critical ratio vector R̄t , the set of winning bids Bw ,
and the time slot t as input, and outputs payment vector
R(t) = (R1 (t), R2 (t), . . . , Rn (t)), where Rj (t) denotes the
payment for user pj at slot t. If user pj loses, then its reward
Rj (t) = 0; otherwise, Rj (t) is set to the corresponding value of
bid divided by the critical ratio. We will prove in next section
that the payment is no less than the corresponding real cost if
user pj submits its real cost.
Fig. 4 provides an illustration of how TIMCC runs offline,
which takes the set of bids B, Q, the set of small tasks 0, and
1781
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Algorithm 4 TIMCC-online
Input: B, Q, 0, T
Output: R
E Bold ← ∅
1 R ← 0,
2 for time slot t = 1 to T do
3
Bwin ← ∅
4
for each task in τi ∈ 0 do
5
initialize critical ratio ri empirically
6
v ← 0, c ← 0, l ← 0
7
for each bid Bkj aim for task τi do
8
9

if

vkj (t)

> ri then
S
Bwin = Bwin {Bkj }

akj

vk (t)

10
11
FIGURE 4. An illustration of how TIMCC works.

12
13

Algorithm 3 TIMCC-offline
Input: B, Q, 0, T
Output: R
E Bold ← ∅
1 R ← 0,
2 for time slot t = 1 to T do
3
Bnew = {Bkj |Bkj ∈ B, tjk = t}
S
4
Bs = Bold Bnew
5
(R̄t , Bw )← WinBidSelection(Bs ,0,Q,t)
6
R(t) ← Pricing(Bw ,R̄t ,t)
7
R ← R + R(t)
∗
8
for each bid Bkj∗ in Bs do
∗
9
update its value to vkj∗ (t + 1)
∗
10
if vkj∗ (t + 1) ≤ 0 then
∗
11
delete Bkj∗ from Bs
12
end
13
end
14
Bold ← Bs
15 end
16 return R

the maximum number of time slots T as input. For each time
slot, we extract new bids from the whole bid set, and merge
it with the old bid set to be the input of WinBidSelection that
determines the winning bids and the critical ratios. Accordingly, Pricing is run to determine the payment for users.
Those processes are detailed in lines 3-7 in Algorithm 3.
Finally, the bid set is updated, the value of bids are updated,
and bids whose value have decreased to zero are excluded.
The updated bid set plays the role of the old bid set that will
be used at the next slot.
For the online case, we assume that the bids come in the
form of flow in each slot, and the platform must make a
decision when it receives a bid. Contrary to the offline case,
the platform cannot determine the critical ratio based on all
the bids, instead it maintains the critical ratio dynamically and
1782

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Rkj (t) = jri
v ← v + vkj (t)
c ← c + akj
ri ← vc
l ←l+1
if l = qi then
break
end
end
end
if l < qi then
select winners from Bold
end
S
Bold = Bold Bwin
∗
for each bead Bkj∗ in Bold do
∗
update its value to vkj∗ (t + 1)
∗
if vkj∗ (t + 1) ≤ 0 then
∗
delete Bkj∗ from Bold
end
end
end
end
return R

selects bids whose ratio is no less than the critical ratio. The
critical ratio is dynamically updated based on the winning
bids. Algorithm 4 depicts how TIMCC runs online. Line 5
initializes the critical ratio for the task. When a bid comes,
if its ratio is no less than the critical ratio, it is selected as a
winning bid immediately. Line 10 determines the reward for
the winning bid, line 11-13 update the critical ratios dynamically. We will prove that the critical ratio is updated with
no decrease in the next part of this paper, which motivates
users to submit their bids earlier. If enough winning bids are
selected, the corresponding task will reject all bids that come
afterward as line 15-17. If not enough users are selected,
the platform turns to the old bids in line 20-22. Finally the
old bids is updated in line 23-29, which makes a preparation
for the next time slot.
VOLUME 8, 2020
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IV. PROPERTIES OF TIMCC

In this section, we analyze TIMCC theoretically to prove
that TIMCC satisfies individual rationality, computational
efficiency, and truthfulness. We analyze the online TIMCC
and prove that the critical ratio is updated with no
decrease.
Lemma 1: TIMCC is individually rational.
Proof: Let pj be a user who bids truthfully, i.e., akj = ckj .
We first prove that a user’s reward is no less than her/his cost.
If pj is a loser for all time slot, then naturally its reward and
cost are zero in both offline and online cases.
If pj is a winner, let its bid Bkj wins at time slot t. We shall
prove that Rkj (t) ≥ ckj .
For the offline case, from Algorithm 2, we know Rkj (t) =
vkj (t)
R̄tj

. Remark that the critical ratio R̄tj is no more than the ratio

(value to bid price) of any winning bid, i.e., R̄tj ≤
Rkj (t)

akj

ckj .

vkj (t)
akj

. Hence

we have
≥
=
For the online case, from line 7 in Algorithm 4, we have
vkj (t)
akj

> ri , Rkj (t) =

vkj (t)
ri

≥ akj = ckj

Then we have TIMCC is individually rational in both
offline and online cases.
Lemma 2: TIMCC is computationally efficient.
Proof: For the offline case, TIMCC consists of three
parts, WinBidSelection, Pricing, and Bids update. The time
complexity of WinBidSelection is O(|0||B|2 ), and once WinBidSelection is finished, critical ratios are determined, Pricing and Bids update have lower time complexity (no more
than O(|B|)). Therefore, WinBidSelection plays a dominant
role in TIMCC. TIMCC runs WinBidSelection for T times,
|B| = O(n), |0| = m, so the time complexity of offline case
is O(Tmn2 ).
For the online case, TIMCC selects winning bids dynamically. In each round, TIMCC just traverses the bid set once
to select winners and maintain the critical ratio, its time
complexity is O(T |B|) = O(Tn).
Lemma 3: TIMCC is truthful.
Proof: Assume a user pj , if it submits its truthful bid
Aj = (τjk , akj , tjk ), where akj = ckj , the corresponding utility
is denoted as Ujk . Now if the user summits an untruthful
bid Âkj = (τjk , âkj , tjk ) instead, where âkj 6 = ckj , and the
corresponding utility is Ûjk . To prove truthfulness, we shall
prove Ujk ≥ Ûjk .
For the offline case, we decompose Ujk and Ûjk into Ujk =
PT
PT
k
k
k
k
k
t=1 Uj (t) and Ûj =
t=1 Ûj (t), where Uj (t) and Ûj (t)
denote the corresponding utility at the slot t. If we can prove
Ujk (t) ≥ Ûjk (t) for all t, then truthfulness holds naturally.
We have the following case analysis.
Case 1: Both Aj and Âj lose at the slot t.
In this case, Ujk (t) = 0, Ûjk (t) = 0, naturally Ujk (t) ≥
Ûjk (t) holds.
Case 2: Aj wins, but Âj loses at the slot t.
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In this case, Ûjk (t) = 0. Because Aj is a truthful bid, and it
wins, from Lemma 1, we have Ujk (t) ≥ 0. So Ujk (t) ≥ Ûjk (t)
holds.
Case 3: Aj wins, and Âj wins too at the slot t.
Remark that in TIMCC, winning bids are selected according to their ratio of value to bid price, assume d winning
bids are selected, the reward is determined by the critical
ratio which is the (d + 1) − th highest ratio. Because both
Aj and Âj win, by submitting untruthful bid Âj , the critical
ratio is not changed, and the reward is not changed further,
i.e. Ujk (t) = Ûjk (t). Naturally, Ujk (t) ≥ Ûjk (t) holds.
Case 4: Aj loses, but Âj wins at the slot t.
For simplicity, we use rj to denote the critical ratio when
truthful bid Aj is submitted, and r̂j to denote the critical ratio
when untruthful bid Âj is submitted. Because Aj loses and Âj
wins, we have Ujk = 0 and r̂j ≥ rj .
Because Aj loses, its ratio is no more that the critical ratio
rj , i.e. 0 < vk ≤ rj , where v denotes the value. Then ckj =
akj ≥

aj

v
rj .

Âj wins, its reward at slot t is Rkj (t) =

v
r̂j

v
rj

≤

≤ ckj .

So Ûjk = Rkj (t) − ckj ≤ 0. Then Ujk (t) ≥ Ûjk (t) holds.
From the above analysis, we can conclude that offline
TIMCC is truthful. Similarly, we can prove that the online
TIMCC is truthful.
Lemma 4: For the online case, the critical ratio in TIMCC
is updated with no decrease.
∗
∗

Proof: Suppose that a bid Bkj∗ wins, whose ratio is
and then the critical ratio is updated from r(t) =
1) =
∗

∗
v+vkj∗
∗
b+bkj∗

v
b

vkj∗

∗

bkj∗

,

to r(t +

. We will prove r(t + 1) ≥ r(t). Because the bid

Bkj∗ wins, we have

∗

vkj∗

∗
bkj∗

≥ r(t), then
∗

r(t + 1) ≥

b ∗ r(t) + bkj∗ ∗ r(t)
∗

b + bkj∗

= r(t)

V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

We conduct extensive simulations to evaluate the performance of TIMCC. We run our tests on a Windows 10 x64 PC
with an AMD Ryzen 5 3600 6-Core 3.60 GHz processor and
32 GB memory. Each bid is randomly generated, where the
real cost and initial value of each bid follow uniform distribution over [3,20] and [1,20], respectively. For the online
case, we initialize the critical ratio of all tasks as the ratios
of the mean initial value and the mean cost. There are ten
time slots T = 10, and each bid time is randomly chosen
from {1, 2, . . . , 10}. As for the decrease of value, we mainly
focus on the linear case, and the decrease rate is set to 2.5,
i.e., when a bid’s age increases by 1, its value decreases by
2.5. If there is no special description, m (which is |0|) is fixed
to 10, and the age threshold K is fixed to 3. Furthermore,
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FIGURE 5. Running time.

FIGURE 6. Average utility.

we let qj be a constant, i.e., qi = qj for any i and j, which
means that different small tasks require the same number of
winners. Because for each user pj , the rewards of the mj bids
are computed independently, we let a user submit only one bid
for the clearness of description and comparison. All results
are averaged over 100 times for each test.
In the remainder of this section, we first examine the
performance of TIMCC. We then further compare TIMCC
with IMS-SS [23].
A. PERFORMANCE OF TIMCC
1) RUNNING TIME

Fig. 5 depicts the impact of the number of users n and the
number of tasks m on running time. In Fig. 5(a), we set the
number of tasks m = 10, let n vary from 2000 to 10000 with
an increment of 500. For each small task, three winners are
required. In Fig. 5(b), we set the number of users n to 8000,
let m vary from 4 to 20 with a step of 2. Other parameters are
the same as Fig. 5(a).
From Fig. 5(a), we observe that with the increment of n,
the running time increases in both the offline and online
cases. The offline case increases with a sppeed of O(n2 ),
while the online case increases with with a linear speed
1784

approximately. From Fig. 5(b), we observe that with the
increment of m, the running time of the offline case increases
with a linear speed, while the running time of the online case
does not increase with m. Those results match our analysis in
Lemma 2.
2) AVERAGE UTILITY

Fig. 6 reveals the average user utility, which is defined as the
total utility of all users over the number of users. Fig. 6(a)
shows the relationship between average utility and the number of users n. The number of users n varies from 2000 to
8000 with a step of 500. We observe that with the increase
of n, the average utility drops dramatically in both offline
and online cases. This is because if there are more users,
the competition among users will become fiercer, thus the
platform can select users with lower cost, which will lead to
a decrement in payment. Furthermore, although the average
utility decrease with n, it never drops to a negative one, which
partly matches our analysis in Lemma 1. The reason why we
say it partly is that the average utility is non-negative does not
mean the utilities of all users are non-negative.
Fig. 6(b) depicts the relationship between the average utility of users and the number of small tasks m. We fix the
VOLUME 8, 2020
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FIGURE 7. Impact of strategic behaviours. (The three cycle dots depict the corresponding truthful bids.)

total number of users n to 8000 and let the number of small
tasks vary from 4 to 20 with a step of 2. It is observed that
when the number of small tasks increases, the average utility
grows in both offline and online cases. On one hand, with
more small tasks, more users will be selected as winners and
receive the payment. On the other hand, with more small
tasks, the competition among users become less fierce, which
will lead to a higher reward for winners.
In both Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b), the average utility of offline
case is higher than that of online case. It is natural that the
platform make a decision on all bids in offline case, so the
platform can buy cheaper bids which lead to a lower payment
for users.
3) IMPACT OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIORS

The impact of strategic behaviors (untruthful bids) on user
utilities is depicted in Fig. 7, where the three circular points
denote their truthful bid prices. In this simulation, we set n
to 1000. The threshold age is set to 2. In Fig. 7(a), we pick
three users: user 6, user 85 and user 105. User 6 and user
85 are winners, while user 105 is a loser when revealing their
true costs 7.702, 3.488 and 12.240, respectively. In Fig. 7(b),
we pick user 12, user 74 and user 116. User 12 and user
74 are winners, while user 116 is a loser when revealing
their true costs 10.402, 5.812 and 12.901, respectively. We let
them change their bid prices in [1.0, 20.0] with a step of 0.5.
It is observed that no user can receive a higher utility by
submitting an untruthful bid in both offline and online cases.
Those results match our analysis in Lemma 3.
B. COMPARISON WITH IMS-SS

In this part, we compare the performance of TIMCC (offline)
with IMC-SS [23] in terms of Average utility, Gain per
payment and Probability of failure. In [23], the authors
proposed three different models: single-requester singlebid model (SS-model), single-requester multiple-bid model
(SM-model), and multiple-requester multiple-bid model
(MM-model). They also designed an incentive mechanism for
each of these models.
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The reason why we compare TIMCC with IMC-SS (Incentive Mechanism for SS-model) rather than IMC-SM (Incentive Mechanism for SM-model) and IMC-MM (Incentive
Mechanism for MM-model) is that in TIMCC, although a
user may submit multiple bids, no more than one bid is
allowed at a single slot, which is very similar to IMC-SS,
where a single user can submit only one bid. IMC-SS first
runs a procedure Job Selection to select jobs that can be
finished with no monopoly user. Then IMC-SS determines
winning users according to the minimum ratio of bid price
to the number of tasks. Finally, it sets the reward to each
winner the critical value. As there exist enough users in our
simulation, it is guaranteed that all tasks can be finished
without monopoly user. So it is safe to leave out Job Selection
in IMC-SS in our scenario.
1) AVERAGE UTILITY & GAIN PER PAYMENT

Note that IMS-SS can be view as a single-round auction,
so we fix T in TIMCC to 1. Furthermore, we limit users in
IMC-SS to submit bids that contain only one single small task
and fix qi to 1 for all i, i.e., all small tasks in TIMCC only
require one winner, then the two models become very similar.
In these settings, both TIMCC and IMC-SS require a few
winners, so we let the number of users n vary in a relatively
small range, and let m vary in a relatively large range.
Fig. 8 depicts how the average utility of users changes
when n and m increase in TIMCC and IMS-SS. Fig. 9 depicts
the relationship between the gain per payment and n and m
in TIMCC and IMS-SS. In Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 9(a), we fix the
number of small tasks m to 10, let the number of users n vary
from 100 to 400 with a step of 20. In Fig. 8(b) and Fig. 9(b),
we fix the number of users n to 2000, and let the number of
small tasks m vary from 5 to 100 with a step of 5.
It is observed from Fig. 8 that the average utility in
both TIMCC and IMS-SS increases with m, but decreases
with n, which matches our previous analysis and the result
in [23]. We also find that the average utility of TIMCC
is always higher than that of IMC-SS. This is because
IMC-SS determines the payment by their bid prices only,
1785
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FIGURE 8. Average utility of TIMCC and IMS-SS.

FIGURE 9. Platform gain pre payment of TIMCC and IMS-SS.

TIMCC determines the payment by the ratio of value to bid
price, which will lead to a little higher payment compared to
IMC-SS. Consider TIMCC provides a higher payment than
IMC-SS, TIMCC may be easier to attract users in practice.
Fig. 9 shows the comparison of gain per payment in
TIMCC and IMS-SS. We observe that the gain per payment
increases with n, but decreases with m, which match our
previous analysis. We also observe that the gain per payment
of TIMCC is always higher than IMS-SS, it is natural because
TIMCC selects winning bids according to the ratio of value
to bid price, but IMS-SS only considers the bid price. In other
words, TIMCC chooses the bids that can bring high gain per
payment, but IMS-SS chooses the bids that are only cheap.
2) PROBABILITY OF FAILURE

Note that if there are not enough users, crowdsensing fails
to work. In Fig. 10, we generate the bid set randomly. Let
TIMCC and IMS-SS run on the bid set. We run the test for
1000 times and record the times that TIMCC and IMS-SS
fail separately. We use frequency as an estimation of the
probability of failure. In Fig. 10(a), we let n vary from 400 to
1400 with a step of 200. It is observed that when there are
not enough users (eg. n = 400), both TIMCC and IMS-SS
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fail many times. With the increment of the number of users
n, the failing times of TIMCC and IMS-SS drop. However,
IMS-SS fails more than TIMCC. In Fig. 10(b), we fix |n| =
1000, and m varies from 6 to 16 with a step of 2. While m
grows, the platform needs more users, so both TIMCC and
IMS-SS fail more times. In this case, IMS-SS fails more than
TIMCC too. This is because TIMCC allows a bid to win more
than once, making it perform much better, especially when
there are not enough users.
VI. RELATED WORK

The design of incentive mechanisms for crowdsensing has
attracted a lot of interests from the research community [9], [11]–[13], [23], [25]–[30]. We summarize incentive
mechanisms for crowdsensing or crowdsourcing into two
categories.
Incentive mechanisms based on auctions. In [23],
the authors presented three models of crowdsensing, namely,
Single-requester Multiple-bid model (SM-model), Multiplerequester Multiple-bid model (MM-model), and Singlerequester Single-bid model (SS-model), where cooperation
of providers are required. They designed an incentive mechanism for each of these models and proved that these incentive
VOLUME 8, 2020
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FIGURE 10. Probability of failure of TIMCC and IMS-SS.

mechanisms are individually rational, budget-balanced, computationally efficient, and truthful. As an extension of [23],
Zhang et al. [12] presented an incentive mechanism TAFA
(Truthful Auction with countermeasures against False-name
Attacks). They also proved that TAFA is both truthful and
robust against false-name attacks. Jaimes et al. [29] considered the locations of users, the coverage, and the budget constraint. They combined the Reverse Auction Dynamic Price
with Recruitment (RADP-VPC-RC) mechanism [31] with
the Greedy Budgeted Maximum Coverage to create a new
Greedy Incentive Algorithm (GIA). Feng et al. [13] designed
an algorithmic mechanism for inducing location-aware collaborative sensing in mobile crowdsourcing. They proved that
optimally determining the winning bids with the location is
NP-hard and proposed a near-optimal task allocation algorithm and a payment scheme that guarantees truthfulness.
Singer and Mittal [27] proposed two online mechanisms to
maximize the number of completed tasks while minimizing
the total payment without exceeding the budget. The authors
in [25] designed RIT (Robust Incentive Tree Mechanism
for Crowdsensing) that motivates users for both participation
and solicitation. They also proved that RIT is sybil-proof with
probability at least H, for any given H ∈ (0, 1). However, all
those mechanisms regard tasks as one-shot tasks, it is not very
suitable to apply those models to continuous crowdsensing,
where tasks require continuous efforts. Our work is in the
interest of filling this gap.
Incentive mechanisms without auctions. In [32],
the authors proposed a non-monetary incentive mechanism
to motivate smartphones to join the crowdsourcing system,
where users are required to offer services to others if the
user wants to receive services from others. Zhang et al. [33]
integrated reputation into existing pricing schemes, and they
used a rigorous repeated game framework to analyze users’
current and future behavior, which achieved an improvement
in performance of the noncooperative equilibria.
VII. FUTURE DIRECTION

In the future, we are particularly interested in further investigating the following directions.
VOLUME 8, 2020

Latency Control. Crowdsensing data may not be sensed
very timely, where the reasons can be explained from different aspects. As mentioned in [34], one strategy for latency
control is pricing, a higher price attracts more workers and
can reduce the latency. However, a higher price naturally
increases the financial burden of the platform at the same
time. Another strategy for latency is a solicitation, i.e., incentivizing users for both participation and solicitation. However,
solicitation brings some challenges to the robustness of price
manipulation.
Sybil Attack. As mentioned in [25], a sybil attack is that a
user may generate multiple fake identities, and gain a higher
utility without devoting extra efforts. The existence of sybil
attack not only increases the burden of the platform, but also
harms the interests of the honest users. The robustness against
sybil attack is also very important to incentive mechanisms.
However, it is beyond the scope of this paper and subjects to
future researches.
VIII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we considered continuous crowdsensing,
where users are required to contribute continuous efforts.
We defined a metric age of data to capture the freshness of
data. We proposed a privacy-preserving incentive mechanism
TIMCC for continuous crowdsensing that takes the age of
data into consideration to reflect of the value of data, which
further determines the rewards in the auction. We also proved
that TIMCC satisfies individual rationality, computational
efficiency, and truthfulness in theory, which is validated by
extensive simulations.
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